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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Clarity or Confusion? The
Constitutionality of a Nebraska Statute Prohibiting
Partial-birth Abortion Procedures. Stenberg v. Carhart,
120 S.Ct. 2597 (2000).
INTRODUCTION

Over twenty-seven years ago, the United States Supreme Court
recognized a woman's right to choose.' In recent years, through progress
and developments in the field of medicine, a new class of late-term abortion procedures has evolved. These procedures, commonly known as
"partial-birth abortions," have incited tremendous controversy and divisiveness throughout the nation. Recognizing the growing public concern
and outrage over the graphic and objectionable nature of these procedures, many states have responded by passing statutory bans on partialbirth abortion.2 In Stenberg v. Carhart,the United States Supreme Court
held that one of these statutory bans, prohibiting partial-birth abortion in
the state of Nebraska, was unconstitutional.3
On June 3, 1997, the Nebraska Legislature passed Legislative
Bill 23 prohibiting "partial-birth abortion.",4 Nebraska's Governor signed
the bill into law on June 9, 1997.5 The statute states:
No partial-birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless
such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother whose
life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or
condition
physical injury, including a life-endangering physical
6
caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
"Partial-birth abortion" is not a medically recognized term, thus
the Nebraska Legislature defined the term to encompass any:

1. SeeRoev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 151-57 (1973).
2. Steven Grasz, If Standing Bear Could Talk ... Why There is No Constitutional
Right to Kill a Partially-BornHuman Being, 33 CREIGHTON L. REVIEW 23, 24 (1999).
Thirty states, in total, have passed some form of partial-birth abortion legislation. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 2633 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
3. Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2605.
4. Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 509 (Neb. 1997).
Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999).
5.
6. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (LEXIS 1998).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2001

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 1 [2001], No. 1, Art. 6
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. I

[A]bortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery. For purposes
of this subdivision, the term partially delivers vaginally a living
unborn child before killing the unborn child means deliberately
and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child,
or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a
procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will
kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child.7
The statute classifies the intentional violation of the statute by a physician as a Class III felony.8
Soon after the enactment of the statute, Dr. Leroy Carhart
brought an action on behalf of himself and his patients, in federal district
court, challenging its constitutionality. 9 Dr. Carhart claimed that Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortion violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it prohibits his patients from choosing a safe and preferred method for terminating their pregnancies before
viability.' ° The district court held the Nebraska statute unconstitutional
because it placed a substantial obstacle and an undue burden upon
women seeking abortion procedures." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. 2
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari, and in a fiveto-four decision, held the statute unconstitutional for two reasons: (1)
The statute lacked any exception for the preservation of the health of the
mother; and (2) the statute unduly burdened a woman's ability to choose
3
a preferred method of abortion.'

7.
8.

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
NEB. REV. STAT. AN.

§ 28-326(9) (LEXIS 1998).

§ 28-328(2) (LEXIS 1998). A Class III felony conviction
can carry a prison term of up to twenty years and a fine of up to $25,000. NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-105 (LEXIS 1998).
9. Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (Neb. 1997). Dr. Carhart is a Nebraska
physician who operates a family medical practice with a specialized abortion facility in
Bellevue, Nebraska. Id. at 509. Stenberg is the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska and was named as the defendant in this case. Id. at 507. Carhart had the "necessary standing to raise both his own rights and the rights of his patients." Id. at 520.
Carhart faced significant risk of criminal prosecution; therefore he had a strong personal
stake in the argument and standing to bring a cause of action. Id. Moreover, Carhart had
standing to assert the interests of his patients because of the unique fiduciary doctor,
patient relationship that existed. Id. at 521.
10.
Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 507, 520.
1I.
Id. at 509.
12.
Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1152 (8th Cir. 1999).
13.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (2000).
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This case note begins with a detailed and technical description of
the relevant abortion procedures that are available and most commonly
utilized by Dr. Carhart as well as other licensed physicians. The note
then outlines the progress and the historical development of the law on
abortion. It then examines and discusses the Supreme Court's interpreta4
tion and application of the abortion precedent set forth in Roe v. Wade'
5
and Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, as applied to
Nebraska Statute § 28-328. This note will analyze and support the
Court's interpretation that the statute prohibits D & X as well as D & E
procedures and will corroborate the majority's decision that the statute is
unconstitutional because it lacked a required health exception. This case
note will close by evaluating the ramifications that the Stenberg decision
will have on a state's ability to implement and enforce partial-birth abortion legislation.
BACKGROUND
Approximately ninety percent of all abortions performed occur
during the first trimester of pregnancy, before the twelfth week of gestation.16 The most commonly used procedure during this gestational period
is "vacuum aspiration."' 7 Vacuum aspiration, which is generally performed using a local anesthetic and on an outpatient basis, involves dilating the cervix and inserting a suction device into the uterus." The
suction device is used to loosen and evacuate the contents of the uterus,
thus aborting the fetus.' 9 Vacuum aspiration is very effective during the
initial twelve weeks of gestation. 20 However, as the fetus develops, this
procedure becomes increasingly ineffective and difficult to perform, due
to the increased size and rigidity of the fetal tissue. 2'
The abortion method most commonly performed during the second trimester of pregnancy, twelve to twenty-four weeks, is "dilation
and evacuation" (D & E). 22 D & E is most prevalent and effective during
the early to middle stages of the second trimester. 23 During a D & E pro14.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

15.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

16.
17.

Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2605.
Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 511 (Neb. 1997). Vacuum aspiration is

also known as suction curettage. Id.
18. Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 2607 (2000).
Id. at 2606.

23. Id. D & E accounts for approximately ninety-five percent of all second trimester
abortions performed during the twelfth and twentieth week of gestational age. Id.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2001
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cedure, the cervix is dilated and surgical instruments are inserted into the
uterus to grasp and remove the friable fetal tissue. 24 The walls of the
uterus are then scraped and suctioned to ensure that no fetal debris re2
mains.

5

During the later stages of the second trimester, the D & E technique must be modified to cope with the increased resistance and stiffness of the tissue. 26 Because the tissue is more rigid, it is difficult to
dismember the fetus inside of the uterus. 27 Thus, surgical forceps are
used to grasp and pull a part of the fetus outside of the uterus, through
the cervix, and into the vagina. 28 The physician then utilizes the resistance created by the cervix to tear the fetal part from the fetal body.29
This process is repeated until the entire fetus has been removed; at which
time vacuum aspiration is performed to remove the remaining fetal debris. 30 Although D & E is favored by most physicians, there are certain

dangers associated with this procedure. Sharp fetal bone fragments and
the surgical instruments create the risk of perforating and damaging the
uterus and surrounding organs. 31 There is also the possibility that a portion of fetal tissue will be left behind and cause complications within the
uterus.32
In an attempt to reduce the risk of perforation, some physicians
have opted to perform a relatively new and extremely controversial procedure called "intact D & E" or "dilation and extraction" (D & X).33 This

procedure is also performed on an outpatient basis and under local anesthesia.34 During a D & X procedure, the cervix is deliberately dilated
over a sequence of days. 5 Once dilated, the physician inserts surgical
forceps into the uterus and forcibly rotates the fetus until it is in the optimal position for a feet first extraction.36 The forceps are used to grasp
24.
Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 512 (Neb. 1997). Friable is an adjective
used to describe objects that can be easily broken, crumbly. WEBSTER'S SCHOOL AND
OFFICE DICTIONARY 137 (New ed. 1978).
25.
Carhart,972 F. Supp. at 512.
26. Id. at 513.
27. Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30. Id.
31.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (2000).
32.

Id.

33.
Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 513.
34. Karen E. Walther, Partial-BirthAbortion: Should Moral Judgment Prevail Over
Medical Judgment? 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 693, 699 (2000).
35. Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 514.
36.
Id.
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and pull the body of the living fetus out of the uterus and into the vaginal
cavity, leaving the head within the uterus. a7 This procedure is usually
performed during the later stages of the second trimester (i.e., nineteen
to twenty-four weeks).3" By this phase of development the fetus has matured to the point where the diameter of the head is too large to allow it
to pass through the cervix intact.39 Thus, the physician must perform a
fetal head reduction procedure. 4 ° Using a pair of surgical scissors, a
small incision is made at the base of the skull allowing a vacuum tube to
be placed inside the cranium to evacuate its contents.4 ' This evacuation
permits the skull to be collapsed, effecting a vaginal delivery of a deceased but otherwise intact fetus.42
There is dispute within the medical community as to whether the
D & X procedure is safer or more effective than the D & E procedure.4 3
There has been no decisive scientific consensus in support of one procedure over the other. 44 However, courts have generally determined that D
& X is safer and more effective.45 In Carhart v. Stenberg, the district
court held that there was clear and convincing evidence that the D & X
procedure is superior to, and safer than D & E and other abortion procedures performed after the first trimester of pregnancy. 46 The court found
that D & X allowed for minimal instrumentation to pass through the cervix, reduced operating time and blood loss, and decreased risk of leaving
fetal parts within the uterus, that could potentially cause serious compli-

37.

Id.

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 514.
Walther, supra note 34, at 700.

41.

Id.

Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (2000). Other less common abortion
procedures include induction, hysterotomy, and hysterectomy. Induction accounts for
five percent of all abortion procedures performed after the first trimester of pregnancy.
Walther, supra note 34, at 700. During induction, a saline solution is inserted into the
uterus to induce labor and cause fetal demise. Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507,
517 (Neb. 1997). Hysterotomy and hysterectomy procedures are generally considered
extremely rare and invasive. Hysterotomy involves the premature surgical removal of
the fetus through an incision in the abdomen. Id. at 517. Hysterectomy necessitates the
surgical removal of the entire uterus and fetus, resulting in the sterilization of the
woman. Id. Due to the increased risks associated with these procedures, they are generally less preferable than the D & E and D & X. Walther, supra note 34, at 701.
43. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (2000).
44.
See generally id. at 2609-12.
45. Id. at 26 10.
46. Carhart v. Stenberg, I I F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1126 (1998).
42.
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cations.4 7 Other federal courts have heard and weighed similar expert
scientific evidence and have come to the same conclusion.48
Relevant Case Law
In the landmark decision Roe v. Wade, a pregnant single woman
challenged the constitutionality of a Texas criminal law prohibiting all
abortions, except when necessary to save the life of the mother.49 The
Roe Court held that a woman has a fundamental right to choose, a right
protected by an individual's right to privacy as established by the Fourteenth Amendment.50 The Supreme Court noted that although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the Court has
held that the Constitution does protect an individual's right to personal
privacy. 51 In Roe, the Court determined that this recognized right is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to undergo an abortion
procedure, although the outer limits of this right have not been defined. 52
The Court also established that the Fourteenth Amendment does not include or protect an unborn and nonviable fetus. Thus, before viability,
the right of a woman to have an abortion overrides the interests of the
unborn nonviable child.53 However, the Court did note that a woman's
right to have an abortion is not unconditional.5 4
The Court determined that a state has an important and legitimate interest in safeguarding the health of the mother and protecting the
potential life of the fetus. 55 As a result, the Court established a trimester
framework for determining when a state may regulate and even prohibit
abortion.5 6 During the first trimester of pregnancy a state may not limit
Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2610.
48. Id. (citing Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d 288, 314
(D.R.I. 1999); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1304-11 (E.D.Mich. 1997);
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997); Causeway
Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp.2d 604, 613-14 (E.D.LA. 1999); Richmond Med. Ctr.
for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp.2d 795, 827, n.40 (E.D.Va. 1998)).
49. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113(1973).
50. Id. at 152-53.
51.
Id. at 152 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio 392
U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
52.
Id. at 153.
53. Id. at 158.
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id. at 163.
47.

56. Id. at 164. The trimester framework breaks down the gestational development of
a child into three separate phases. The first three months of pregnancy, or the initial
twelve weeks of gestation, is defined as the first trimester. The second trimester encompasses the second three months of pregnancy, or the thirteenth through twenty-fourth
week of gestation. The third trimester describes the final three months of pregnancy,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol1/iss1/6
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or regulate abortion procedures performed by licensed physicians.
Rather, the abortion decision must be left to the judgment of the woman
and her attending physician.17 Throughout the second trimester of pregnancy a state, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may
regulate abortion procedures in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health."8 During the third trimester, the stage subsequent to viability, a state may promote its interest in potential human life by regulating
and even proscribing abortion procedures, unless the procedure might be
necessary to preserve the health or the life of the mother.5 9 In Doe v.
Bolton, a case that was decided concurrently with Roe, the Supreme
Court determined that factors such as physical, familial, emotional, and
psychological well-being can all be taken into consideration when evaluating the health of the mother. 60
In PlannedParenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, five abortion clinics and a physician challenged the constitutionality of several
provisions in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.61 In this
case, the Supreme Court adopted a new standard for determining when
and how a state may regulate abortion procedures.62 The Court discarded
the trimester framework it established in Roe and adopted a less rigid
standard.6 3 In an attempt to reconcile a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy with the profound and legitimate state interest in promoting
and protecting potential life, the Court adopted the "undue burden" standard.6 An undue burden exists if the purpose or effect of the law is to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. 65
from the twenty-fifth week, on until birth. Id.
57. Id. at 166.
58.

Id. at 164.

59. Id. at 164-65. Viability is defined as the initial point at which there is a realistic
possibility that an unborn child could survive outside the womb of the mother. Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
60. 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
61. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The provisions challenged were in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3205, 3206, 3209, 3203,
3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(f) (West 1191). Id.
62. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 875-77. The Court tried to accommodate and give more power to the
state's interests in the area of abortion, noting that not all regulations should be deemed
unwarranted. Id.
65. Id. at 878. The Court determined that a spousal notification provision in the
Pennsylvania act was a substantial barrier and thus an undue burden. Id. at 893. However, the Court held that informed consent requirements, a parental consent provision,
reporting and record keeping requirements, and a twenty-four hour waiting period after
a consultation with the abortion physician was not an undue burden upon a woman. Id.
at 875-901.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2001
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A state is prohibited from enacting a law that imposes an undue burden
on a woman's decision to choose an abortion procedure before viability. 66 Although the undue burden standard gives states more power to
regulate abortions, the Court reaffirmed Roe's central holdings: (1) Before fetal viability, the woman has the right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy; and (2) Subsequent to viability, "[t]he state in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
67
mother.t
Prior to Stenberg, Planned Parenthoodof Ctr. Mo. v. Danforth
was the only case in which the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting a specific late-term abortion procedure.68 In Danforth, two licensed physicians and a non-profit organization challenged the constitutionality of a Missouri abortion statute. 69 The
Missouri statute prohibited the saline induction abortion procedure, the
most common and safest second trimester abortion procedure at that time
(1976).7 0 The Court determined that the statute was unconstitutional because it was designed to prevent the vast majority of abortion procedures
performed after the first trimester of pregnancy. 7' Although the Court in
Danforth applied the trimester framework set forth in Roe, Danforth
provided useful direction for lower courts to follow when deciding similar cases under the current "undue burden standard" set forth in Casey.72
Before the decision in Stenberg, several federal circuit courts
had addressed state statutes prohibiting partial-birth abortion procedures.
Id. at 879.
67.
Id.
68.
Walther, supra note 34, at 704 (citing Planned Parenthood of Ctr. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
69. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52.
70.
Id. at 53-54. The statute prohibited, "[A]fter the first 12 weeks of pregnancy the
abortion procedure of saline amniocentesis as "deleterious to maternal health." Id. 428
U.S. at 52 (quoting V.A.M.S. § 188.050 s(9) (citation omitted)).
71.
Id. at 54. The Court in Danforth, like the Court in Roe, held that the right to
privacy and a woman's right to an abortion is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action. Id. at 60. Danforth is closely
analogous to Stenberg in that the statutes in both cases were interpreted as prohibiting
the most commonly performed second trimester abortion procedures. The Missouri
statute was interpreted to prohibit saline induction, the most common second trimester
abortion procedure during the 1970s and early 1980s. Id. at 53-54. The Nebraska statute
was interpreted to prohibit D & X, the most common second trimester abortion procedure during the late 1980s and 1990s. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2617
66.

(2000).
72.

Danforth was decided in 1976, Casey was decided in 1992.
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In Women's Medical ProfessionalCorp. v. Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit
held an Ohio state law regulating partial-birth abortion unconstitutional.73 The Ohio statute specifically prohibited the D & X procedure
but was silent as to whether the D & E procedure was also prohibited.74
However, the court construed the language of the statute to encompass
and proscribe both the D & X and D & E procedure and held that prohibiting the D & E procedure placed a substantial obstacle in the path of
women seeking pre-viability abortions, thus unduly burdening their right
to choose.75
In Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, the
Third Circuit held a partial-birth abortion statute unconstitutional.76 The
case was adjudicated before the Supreme Court's opinion in Stenberg
was released; thus Casey was the controlling law. 77 The New Jersey statute was almost identical in wording to the Nebraska statute. 78 The Third
Circuit held that the statute was void for vagueness and was unconstitutional because it "unduly burdened a woman's constitutional right to
obtain an abortion., 79 The court broadly interpreted the statute as prohibiting many conventional abortion methods, including D & E.80 The court

73.

130 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1997).

74.

OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(B) (Anderson 1996). The statute provides in

pertinent part, "No person shall knowingly perform or attempt to perform a dilation and
extraction procedure upon a pregnant woman." Id. The D & X procedure is defined as
"[T]he termination of a human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction device into
the skull of a fetus to remove the brain." Id. "Dilation and extraction procedure does not
include either the suction curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abortion." Id. at § 2919.15(A).
75. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200, 202-03.
76. No. 99-5042, 2000 WL 1025617, at *1, 23 (3d Cir. 2000). A health care facility
and several physicians brought an action against the New Jersey attorney general and
state agencies, challenging the constitutionality of a New Jersey partial-birth abortion
statute. Id. at *1.The Third Circuit also affirmed the essential holding in Roe, that a
woman has a constitutional right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at *13.b.
77.
The opinion in Farmerwas published subsequent to Stenberg, consequently the
majority opinion in Farmerstates that its decision confirms and supports the controlling
decision made by the Supreme Court in Stenberg. Id. at * 1. The majority noted that their.
decision was not at odds with the Court's decision in Stenberg and went on to imply that
if it were at odds they would have modified their decision to comply with the Stenberg
holding. Id.
78. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:65A-6(e) (LEXIS 1998)). The statute prohibited
"an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a
living human fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." Id.
79. Id. at *13.
80.

Id.
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also found that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not provide for a health exception as required by Casey."l
In Richmond Medical Centerfor Women v. Gilmore, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia partial-birth abortion
statute. There, the court ruled in favor of the state, staying the district
court's preliminary injunction of Virginia Code § 18.274.2(A).8 3 The
wording of the statute was very similar to the wording of the Nebraska
statute, and the district court interpreted it to include and prohibit D & E
as well as vacuum aspiration. 84 However, the Fourth Circuit narrowly
interpreted the Virginia statute to have a different meaning and with assurances from the Commonwealth of Virginia, determined that the statute was only intended to prohibit D & X procedures.8 5 Since the plaintiffs in Gilmore did not perform D & X procedures, the court granted the
stay, reasoning that the plaintiffs probably lacked standing to bring a
cause of action because they did not face a reasonable fear of prosecution. 86
In Hope Clinic v. Ryan, the Seventh Circuit also upheld the constitutionality of two partial-birth abortion statutes, 7 concluding that both
statutes could be applied in a constitutional manner.8 8 Based in part on
assurances by both the Wisconsin and Illinois attorney generals that neither statute applied to D & E, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
statutes only prohibited D & X procedures.8 9 The court reasoned that
81.
Id.
82.
144 F.3d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1998). Several physicians and medical clinics
brought an action to enjoin enforcement of a Virginia partial-birth abortion statute. Id.
at 326.
83.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2(A) (LEXIS 1998). The statute provides in part: "[A]
physician shall not knowingly perform a partial-birth abortion that is not necessary to
save the life of a mother." Id. ("A partial-birth abortion is defined as an abortion in
which the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally delivers a living
fetus or a substantial portion thereof into the vagina for the purpose of performing a
procedure the person knows will kill the fetus, performs the procedure, kills the fetus
and completes the delivery.")
84.
Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 331.
85. Id. at 331-33.
86. Id. at 332.
87. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 513/5, 513/10, 513/15 (West 1999); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.16. (West 1998). The wording in both statutes and in Nebraska's, Arkansas',
and Iowa's statute is similar.
88.
195 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Abortion providers brought suit against
Illinois Attorney General and State's Attorney, challenging constitutionality of Illinois
statute prohibiting partial-birth abortions, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions."). Abortion providers also brought a separate action challenging a Wisconsin
partial-birth abortion statute, and on appeal, the two cases were consolidated. Id.
89. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 869.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol1/iss1/6
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" . ..States have a powerful interest in working out the details of their
criminal laws in their own courts." 90 However, in response to the plaintiffs contention that the statutes were vague and thus potentially unduly
burdensome, the Seventh Circuit, on remand, ordered the district court to
enter precautionary injunctions, prohibiting the application of the statutes to D & E or induction until the states provided additional specificity
as to the meaning of the statutes. 9' The Seventh Circuit also considered
whether the prohibition of the D & X procedure, without a health exception, was unconstitutional. The court determined that proscribing D & X
is constitutional, even if the statute did not provide for a health exception, stating that no state could otherwise regulate any abortion procedure. 92 The court reasoned that a doctor would only use the D & X procedure if he believed it to be the best procedure for preserving the health
of the mother.9 3
In addition to Stenberg, the Eighth Circuit has presided over two
cases pertaining to partial-birth abortion statutes. The two statutes in
question contained similar language. The Eighth Circuit, applying the
undue burden standard set forth in Casey, deemed each to be unconstitutional.94 In PlannedParenthoodof GreaterIowa, Inc. v. Miller, several
physicians brought an action against the Iowa Attorney General challenging the constitutionality of Iowa's partial-birth abortion statute. 95
The Eighth Circuit determined that the Iowa statute prohibited D & X as
well as D & E, thus unduly burdening women seeking abortions by placing a substantial obstacle in their path.96 The court broadly interpreted
90. Id.
91. Id. The court wanted the states to somehow clarify exactly what the statutes did
and did not prohibit. Id.
92. Id. at 873.
93. Id.
94. The Eighth Circuit based its decisions on the Supreme Court's core holding in
Roe that "[A] woman has a constitutional right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy." See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1148 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Roe v.
Wade 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
95.
195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999).
96. Miller, 195 F.3d at 388-89 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8A(2) (West 1999)).
The statute reads in pertinent part, "A person shall not knowingly perform or attempt to
perform a partial-birth abortion. This prohibition shall not apply to partial-birth abortion
that is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury." Id. IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8A(l)(c)
(West 1999). " 'Partial-birth abortion' means an abortion in which a person partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery."
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8A(1)(d) (West 1999). "Vaginally delivers a living fetus means
deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living fetus or substantial
portion of a living fetus for the purpose of performing a procedure the person knows
will kill the fetus, and then killing the fetus." Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2001

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 1 [2001], No. 1, Art. 6

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

242

Vol. I

the statute to include D & E, reasoning that delivering an arm of a fetus
into the vagina was a substantial portion of the living fetus, and since
such a delivery commonly occurs in a D & E procedure, the statute prohibited it.97 In Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Jegley, a case
decided along with Stenberg, the court held that an Arkansas statute prohibiting partial-birth abortions "covered too much," meaning that the
statute intended to prohibit D & X as well as D & E, thus unduly burdening women seeking abortions before fetal viability. 98
In Carhartv. Stenberg, Dr. Carhart challenged the constitutionality of Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortion. 99 The district court held
the statute unconstitutional. °° On appeal, the Eighth Circuit broadly interpreted Nebraska Statute § 28-328(1) to include the prohibition of D &
E, the most common abortion procedure performed during the second
semester.'01 Therefore, the court determined that the statute placed a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion and thus
unduly burdened her right to choose. 0 2
The Eighth Circuit, as well as the district court, extensively examined medical findings as well as testimony proffered by various physicians, regarding the subject of abortion. 0 3 The testimony of Dr.
Carhart revealed that he employs special variations when performing the
various procedures described above.' 4 For example, during a D & X
procedure, Dr. Carhart testified that he does not attempt to rotate the
fetus to effect a feet first extraction.10 5 Instead, he removes the fetus in
the position that he finds it, although preferably feet first.'0 6 Furthermore, Dr. Carhart attempts to perform his variation of the D & X procedure primarily on living fetuses between the sixteenth and twentieth
weeks, instead of between the twentieth and twenty-fourth week. 0 7 After
the twentieth week of gestation, Carhart usually induces fetal death by
97.

Miller, 195 F.3d at 389.

98. 192 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 1999). Abortion physicians brought an action challenging the constitutionality of an Arkansas partial-birth abortion statute. Id. at 794
(citing ARK. CODE ANN § 5-61-202 (Michie 1997)). The statute prohibited abortions "in
which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus
before taking the life of the fetus ... "Id.
99.
100.
101.

972 F. Supp. 507, 509 (Neb. 1997).
Id.
Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 1999).

102.

Id. at 1151.

103.
104.

See id. at 1145-50; Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 510-20.
Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 521-22.

105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 522.
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injection of a lethal substance, before attempting to remove the fetus
from the uterus.' °8 Under the Nebraska statute, a physician is only prohibited from partially delivering a living unborn child before terminating
its life.' °9 Thus Dr. Carhart is primarily at risk of prosecution for abortion procedures he performs between the sixteenth and twentieth week,
while during partial delivery, the child is still alive." °
Dr. Carhart does not perform abortions on viable fetuses."' Fetal
viability usually occurs around the twenty-fourth week of gestational
maturity and is defined as the time " ... at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that
the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman.''1 2 Dr. Carhart did not challenge Nebraska's right to promote
fetal life by prohibiting partial-birth abortions after a fetus has reached
viability. Rather, Dr. Carhart argued:
Nebraska's ban on the partial-birth abortion procedure has the
effect of subjecting his patients to an appreciably greater risk of
injury or death than would be the case if these women could rely
on him to perform his variant of the banned procedure on nonviable fetuses when medically advisable. Such a ban, therefore, is
an "undue burden" to women seeking abortions, and it 3violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Dr. Carhart also alleged4 that the statute was invalid because it
was unconstitutionally vague."
The district court held the Nebraska statute unconstitutional as
applied to Dr. Carhart and his patients, because it fails the "undue burden" test established in Casey." 5 The district court did not reach a conclusion as to Dr. Carhart's vagueness argument." 6 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the

108.

109.
110.
IIi.
112.

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (LEXIS 1998).
Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 522.
Id. at 521.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 509.

Id.
Id.

Id. It was unnecessary, given their conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional under the "undue burden" argument. Id.
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district court,
and the United States Supreme Court subsequently granted
7
certiorari.11
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Stenberg, the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's determination that Nebraska's partial-birth abortion statute was unconstitutional."'
The majority held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution on two independent bases." 9 First, the law lacked any
exception for the preservation of the health of the mother, and second
the statute was unconstitutional because it applied to D & E as well as D
& X, thus imposing an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose D
& E, ". . . thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion it120
self."'
Health Exception
Justice Breyer, delivering the majority opinion, first considered
whether the Nebraska statute required a health exception to be considered constitutional. The statute states, in pertinent part: "No partial-birth
abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother ..... ,,12 Note that this statute does not
constitute a health exception. This statute only constitutes a life exception, which is a much higher bar for women and physicians to overcome.
Applying the standard set forth in Casey, the majority held that a statute
requires a health exception where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 22 The
majority also reiterated that a state may promote but may never endanger
the health of a woman, when furthering its own interests by regulating
23
abortion.

117. Id. at 509 cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
118.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (2000).
119. Eight opinions were filed in the case. Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Justice Stevens
filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice O'Connor filed a
concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Stevens joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scaliajoined.
120.
120 S. Ct. at 2609.
121.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (LEXIS 1998).
122.
Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2609.
123.
Id.
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The state of Nebraska argued that partial-birth abortion laws
only require a health exception when there is a need for such a health
exception, and there is no such need for a health exception when a state
is only trying to prohibit D & X. 124 Nebraska set forth eight separate arguments demonstrating why its law limiting abortion needed no such
health exception. Nebraska argued:
1) The D & X procedure is rarely used.
2) When D & X is used, it is only performed by a handful of
doctors.
3) D & E and induction are always safer alternatives to D & X.
4) A ban on D & X would not increase a woman's risk of several
rare abortion complications.
5) D & X creates special risks of serious complications during
surgery.
6) There are no medical studies comparing the safety of D & X
to other partial-birth abortion procedures, or even studies
proving the safety of D & X itself.
7) There are no identifiable situations in which intact D & X is
the only appropriate procedure needed to induce abortion.
8) The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
could identify no situation in which the D & X procedure
could be the only option for preserving the health of the
25
mother. 1
The majority found these eight arguments insufficient to establish that Nebraska's statute did not require a health exception. The Court
responded to each of Nebraska's eight arguments, as follows:
1) The infrequent use of D & X is irrelevant, because "[T]he
health exception question is whether protecting women's
health requires an exception for those infrequent situations."
2) The fact that only a handful of doctors perform D & X may
not accurately reflect the contention that late second-term
abortions are comparatively rare.
3) D & E and induction are safe; however, D & X was significantly safer in some circumstances.

124.

Id. at 2610.

125. Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2610-1I. In their fifth argument the state relied on an
Amici Brief by the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Stenberg v.
Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99-830). In their seventh argument, the state relied
upon Late Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, AMA Policy H-5.982 (1997). Id.
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4) There were advantages to D & X, such as the elimination of
the risk of an embolism due to tissue entering the blood
stream.
5) The D & X procedure normally does not pose greater risks
than alternative abortion procedures.
6) There are no medical studies documenting the comparative
safety of D & X to other procedures.
7) The Court did not deny the statement made by the AMA, as
pointed out in Nebraska's seventh separate argument.
8) The Court refuted Nebraska's final argument by quoting the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist's brief,
which stated that" . . . depending on the physician's skill and
experience, the D & X procedure can be the most appropriate
abortion procedure for some women in some circum126
stances."
In sum, the majority determined that a statute which entirely
prohibits the D & X procedure, without a health exception, creates a significant health risk to women and is therefore unconstitutional under the
law set forth in Casey.127
The Majority'sAnalysis of the Undue Burden Standard
Applying the standard set forth in Casey, the majority had to determine whether the statute had the " . . . effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of -a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.' 128 Nebraska argued that the statute, when properly interpreted, imposed no limitation on a woman's ability to choose D & E because the
statutory term "substantial portion" only applies when a physician delivers a fetus up to its head (D & X) and does not apply when a physician
delivers anything less than an entire fetal body into the birth canal, with
129
intentions of dismemberment (D & E).
Nebraska also argued that the Court should defer to the state's

126. Id. at 2610-11. In response to Nebraska's fifth argument, the majority relied on
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist's Brief, Stenberg v. Carhart,
120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99-830). The majority agreed with Nebraska's sixth argument. In response to Nebraska's eighth argument, the majority quoted Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 21, Stenberg v.

Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99-830).
127.

Id. at 2613.

128.

Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 877

(1992)).
129.

Id. at 2614.
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interpretation of its own statute. 30 The majority did not accept the Attorney General's narrow interpretation of the statute; instead, it followed
the lower federal court's broader interpretation.' 3' The Court held that
pulling an arm or leg into the birth canal, before dismemberment, (D &
E) would also constitute delivering a "substantial portion" of an unborn
child. 32 Therefore, the majority concluded that the D & E procedure fell
within the statutory prohibition; thus the statute placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a D & E abortion.133 In short, the
majority held that the statute was unconstitutional because it imposed an
perundue burden on a woman's right to choose the most commonly
34
pregnancy.
of
trimester
first
the
after
formed abortion technique
ConcurringOpinions
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, wrote a
short concurring opinion. 3 5 In his opinion, Justice Stevens wrote, "it is
impossible for me to understand how a state has any legitimate interest
in requiring a doctor to follow any procedure other than the one that he
or she reasonably believes will best protect the woman in her exercise of
this constitutional liberty.', 36 He also stated that the D & X procedure is
human life
no more brutal, more gruesome, or less respectful of potential
37
allows.
still
it
claimed
Nebraska
which
E,
&
than D
Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurring opinion. In her opinion, she stated that a partial-birth abortion statute that only prohibits D &
X and includes an exception for the health of the mother, would be constitutional. 3 8 She determined that prohibiting D & X alone would not
amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion, if there were safer, adequate alternative

Id.
Id. The Eighth Circuit broadly interpreted the phrase "substantial portion" as
131.
describing and therefore prohibiting the D & E procedure. Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d
1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 1999).
132. Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2613.
133. Id. at 2617.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2617 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg also wrote a short concurring opinion in which Justice Stevens joined. Id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens reasoned that the two procedures
were equally gruesome and that it would be irrational for a state, in furthering its own
130.

legitimate interest, to ban one procedure but not the other. As a result, he determined

that Nebraska was not actually attempting to further its own legitimate interest in the
potentiality of human life when it enacted the statute. Id.
138. Id. at 2620 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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methods available, from which a woman and her physician could
choose.

39

Dissenting Opinions
Justice Kennedy, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist joined,
filed a lengthy dissent. Justice Kennedy first criticized the majority's
failure to accord any weight to the interests of separate states. Justice
Kennedy urged that, "Casey is premised on the States having an important constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion debate.' 140 He also contended that the issue was not whether the Court
could discern the difference between the D & X and D & E procedures;
the issue was whether the state of Nebraska could. 14 ' According to Justice Kennedy, Nebraska should be entitled to differentiate between the
two procedures. 42 Citing Casey, Justice Kennedy argued, " . . . where
the difference in physical safety is, at best, marginal, the State may take
into account the grave moral issues presented by a new abortion
method."'' 43 Observing that there are no studies supporting the contention
that D & X is safer than other conventional methods, Justice Kennedy
urged that state legislatures should be given the widest latitude when
making judgments in which the medical community in is vast disagree44
ment.
Justice Kennedy also expressed his disapproval of the majority's
holding that the statute lacked a health exception, stating that there is
never a medical need to perform the D & X procedure. 45 D & X also has
disadvantages "versus other methods because it requires a high degree of
surgical skill to pierce the skull with a sharp instrument in a blind procedure.' 46 Disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that the D & X procedure is a part of standard medical practice, Justice Kennedy suggested
that Nebraska's law did not deny any woman a safe or superior medical
abortion procedure.147 "The most to be said for the D & X is it may pre139. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). She did however state that a state's interest in
regulating abortions before viability is considerably weaker than after viability. Id. at
2618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2625 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141.
Id. at 2626 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
142.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2628 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2628, 2630 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 2628 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Boehm, a supporter of abortion rights). Dr. Boehm is, however, opposed to the D & X procedure. Id.
146. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Dr. Haskell, 139 Cong. Rec. 8605 (1993)).
Dr. Haskell is a leading proponent of and expert on the D & X procedure. Id.
147. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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sent an unquantified lower risk of complication for a particular patient
but that other proven safe procedures remain available .... ,,14' He contended that the unsubstantiated, marginal health differences that the majority 4relied
upon did not amount to a substantial obstacle in a woman's
9
path.1
Justice Kennedy addressed Justice O'Connor's assurance that a
state statute solely prohibiting D & X and including a health exception
would be constitutional. He asserted that the assurance is meaningless.' 50
Justice Kennedy reasoned that if the health exception is left up to the
medical judgment of a physician, the physician will always assert that
there is a health exception, thus always allowing him to perform the procedure. 5 '
Justice Kennedy further concluded that the majority misinterpreted the text of the statute, stating that the text demonstrates that the
statute was only intended to apply to the D & X procedure. 52 He relied
on a "commonsense" interpretation of the word "delivery," emphasizing
that it could only be understood to mean the removal of an intact fetus
(D & X).1' According to Justice Kennedy, the term "delivery" could not
be used to describe how a fetus is brought out of the uterus and into the
vagina during a D & E procedure; rather the term "emerges" or "a physician pulling" better describes how a fetus is removed. 54 Looking at "the
statutory text, the commonsense understanding must be that the statute
covers only the D & X procedure."' 55 Kennedy validated this argument
by quoting the American Medical Association (AMA), which wrote:
"The partial-birth abortion legislation is by its very name aimed exclusively at a procedure by which a living fetus is intentionally and deliberately given partial-birth and delivered for the purpose of killing it. There
is no other abortion procedure which could be confused with that de-

148. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 2628-29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This infers that there is no need for a
health exception because D & X is, at best, marginally safer. Thus there would never be
a need, with regards to safety, to opt for the D & X procedure over any other accepted
procedure. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
151.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152.
Id. at 2632 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Thus, the statute could not be interpreted to include the D & E procedure. Justice Kennedy also pointed out that the majority used the
words "a physician pulling" rather than "a physician delivering" when addressing the D
& E procedure. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155.
Id. at 2633 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2001

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 1 [2001], No. 1, Art. 6
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. I

scription."' 56 Justice Kennedy relied on the holding in Frisby v. Schultz
to imply that the lower courts "ran afoul" by not interpreting the statute
to avoid constitutional difficulties. 57 Justice Kennedy concluded by asserting that the Court ignored substantial medical and ethical opinion,
and instead substituted" . . . its own judgment for the judgment of Ne' 58
braska and some thirty other States and sweeps the law away."'
Justice Thomas, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia joined, also filed a lengthy dissent. Justice Thomas initially expressed his disapproval and disagreement with the decision handed down
in Roe v. Wade. 159 According to Justice Thomas, a state has a legitimate
interest in regulating abortion and fetal life during all stages of development.16° He criticized the Court's application of Casey's undue burden
standard, stating that if the Nebraska law "... is unconstitutional under
Casey, then Casey meant nothing at all, and the Court should candidly
'6
admit it.' '
Justice Thomas argued that the majority misinterpreted the
meaning of the statute, stating " . . . we interpret statutes according to
their plain meaning and we do not strike down statutes susceptible of a
narrowing construction.' 62 Justice Thomas also refuted several of the
principal arguments upon which the majority based its interpretation of
the statute:

156. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting AMA Factsheet 3) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Nebraska statute heading is entitled "Partial-birth abortion." Justice
Kennedy is inferring that the phrase "no other abortion procedure" refers to D & E.
Justice Kennedy also criticized the majority's reliance on other lower federal court's
interpretation of similarly worded abortion statutes and suggested that the majority was
trying to shield themselves from criticism. See id. at 2634 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He
stated that the lower courts have "no special competence" when it comes to interpreting
abortion laws. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). ("It is an abdication of responsibility for the
Court to suggest its hand are tied by decisions which paid scant attention to Casey's
recognition of the State's authority and misapplied the doctrine of construing statutes to
avoid constitutional difficulty.") Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483
(1988)). Justice Kennedy is suggesting that the lower courts could have avoided constitutional difficulties by applying a narrow interpretation and excluding D & E from the
meaning of the statute. See id.
158. Id. at 2634-35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2637 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas was inferring that the Court misapplied the undue burden standard and completely disregarded a state's interest in regulating abortion.
162. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). "We," refers to the Supreme Court.
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1) He rejected the contention that the Nebraska Legislature
should have used medical nomenclature to describe the D &
X procedure, contending that the term D & X did not have a
medical meaning at the time the statute was constructed.
2) He stated that the term D & X was ambiguous on its face and
that the term "partial-birth abortion" better described what the
state legislature intended to prevent.
3) He rebutted the majority's argument that the Supreme Court
generally defers to the lower federal courts' interpretations of
state law. Justice Thomas cited Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Frisby v. Schultz, which stated that the Court does not always
follow the lower courts' construction of a state statute, espeof the
cially when the lower courts endorse a broad reading
163
law, which results in constitutional difficulties.
Justice Thomas next addressed whether the statute was unconstitutional because it did not contain a health exception. According to Justice Thomas, even without a health exception the statute did not create a
substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.'" He argued that the
majority could not identify any real or substantial barrier to women
seeking an abortion and that, even if there were such an obstacle, it
would not affect an adequate number of women to justify a facial invalidation of the law. 65 Lastly, Justice Thomas asserted that none of the
Justices, in the majority or concurring opinions had identified the
"significant body of medical opinion" that supports the finding that D &
66
X may be safer than D & E.'
ANALYSIS

Roe and Casey clearly hold that a woman has a constitutional
right to terminate her pregnancy. The state of Nebraska sought to erode
this fundamental right through the enactment of partial-birth abortion
legislation that substantially inhibited a woman's right to make an aborId. at 2646-47 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163.
164. Id. at 2653 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2654 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He asserted that the majority justified striking down the statute by relying on an uncorroborated "significant body of medical opinion." Chief Justice Rehnquist also filed a dissent. Id. at 2620-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, he reiterated his disapproval with the majority's decision in
Casey and supported Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas' dissenting opinions. See Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 262124 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also expressed his disapproval with the decision in Casey and his will to return the decision of abortion back to the people of the
separate states. Id. at 2623 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion decision. 167 The Supreme Court was correct in holding that the Nebraska statute was unconstitutional because it (1) placed an undue burden upon a woman seeking an abortion, and (2) lacked the required
health exception needed to preserve the health and the life of the
6

mother.

1

The Undue Burden

The Court was correct to broadly interpret the meaning of the
statute to prohibit D & E as well as D & X. It is evident that the Nebraska Legislature intended to regulate more than just the D & X procedure. The bill's legislative history indicates that the legislature was seeking to implement a broad ban on late-term partial-birth abortions. 69 The
specific purpose of the act was not to ban any particular abortion procedure. Instead, as one of the bill's sponsors
stated, the legislature "tried to
70
be as encompassing as possible.'
Additionally, Senator Maurstad, the bill's chief sponsor, acknowledged that the law "could operate in the first trimester of pregnancy." 1 1 When addressing the meaning of the term "substantial" he
stated that the meaning "would be subjective," recognizing that "onethird" of a fetus could be a "substantial portion" and "one-fourth" could
be, depending on "which fourth.' 7 2 He agreed "as small a portion of the
fetus as a foot would constitute a substantial portion."' 173 Perhaps the best
167. Brief Amicus Curiae of Family First at 8, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597
(2000) (No. 99-830). Twenty-nine other states have also created statutes that prohibit
partial-birth abortions. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
168. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2609.
169. The Nebraska legislative history for Legislative Bill 23 is unavailable to the
author, however pertinent sections of the bill's history can be found in Petitioners' and
Respondents' Briefs, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99-830).
170. Respondents' Brief at 4, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99830) (quoting Nebraska legislative history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to
the author but can be found in the Joint Appendix at 475-79 (Senator Hilgert)).
171.
Respondents' Brief at 4, Stenberg (No. 99-830) (citing Nebraska legislative
history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to the author but can be found in the
Joint Appendix at 458-59). This supports the contention that the statute could be applied
to more than D & X because D & X is not performed on a fetus during the first stage of
pregnancy.
172. Respondents' Brief at 6, Stenberg (No. 99-830) (quoting Nebraska legislative
history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to the author but can be found in the
Joint Appendix at 430-3 1).
173.
Respondents' Brief at 6, Stenberg (No. 99-830) (quoting Nebraska legislative

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol1/iss1/6

22

Majors: Constitutional Law - Clarity or Confusion - The Constitutionality

2001

CASE NOTE

evidence that the Nebraska Legislature intended to prohibit both D & X
as well as D & E is the fact that it defeated an amendment that would
have substituted the term "partial-birth abortion" with the term "intact
dilation and extraction"(D & X).17 4 During the debate on the amendment,
Senator Maurstad "admitted that replacing 'partial-birth' abortion with
'intact dilation and extraction; would 'change what the bill is designed to
do.' tt175
In Petitioners' brief, Attorney General Stenberg also relied upon
Nebraska's legislative history to assert that the intent of the legislature
and the purpose of the bill was to only prohibit the D & X procedure. He
quoted the first words spoken by the sponsoring senator during legislative consideration of the bill: "My personal priority bill, LB 23, would
prohibit the use of partial-birth abortion procedure, also know as dilation
and extraction, in the state of Nebraska.' 76 Petitioner pointed out that
during the legislative session, there was an amendment that added the
language "substantial portion" to the statute "for the purpose of clarifying that the D & E procedure was not covered by the bill.' 7 He also
quoted a statement made by Senator Maurstad during a floor debate:
"The changed language is in the bill now: [it] makes it clear beyond any
question that the accepted abortion procedure known as dilation and
evacuation, also referred to as D & E, is not covered by the bill ... ,178
history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to the author but can be found in the
Joint Appendix at 452-53). Delivering a fetal hand or one-third of a fetus does not describe D & X; it describes D & E or possibly vacuum aspiration. ("Maurstad plainly
acknowledged that dismembering the fetus after 'more than a little bit' of it had been
delivered into the vagina would violated the Act."). Respondents' Brief at 6, Stenberg
(No. 99-830) (quoting Nebraska legislative history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to the author but can be found in the Joint Appendix at 442-43). Thus D & E would
violate the act.
174.
Brief of the Naral Foundation, the Feminist Majority Foundation, the National
Partnership for Women & Families, the National Women's Law Center and People for
the American Way Foundation at 13, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No.
99-830) (quoting Nebraska legislative history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable
to the author but can be found in the Joint Appendix at 404). This acknowledgment
readily supports the contention that the bill was designed to prohibit more that just D &
X.
175. Id. (quoting Nebraska legislative history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to the author but can be found in the Joint Appendix at 381).
176. Petitioners' Opening Brief at 22, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000)
(No. 99-830) (citing Nebraska legislative history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to the author but can be found in the Eighth Circuit Appendix at 1639). Petitioner
quotes this statement to evidence that "from the very beginning the statute's intent was
to ban the D & X procedure." Id.
177.
Id.
178. Id. at 22-23 (quoting Nebraska legislative history of Legislative Bill 23 that is
unavailable to the author but can be found in the Eighth Circuit Appendix at 1779). The
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However, here is the fault. If the legislature truly wanted to make it
clear, beyond any question, that D & E was not covered by the bill, why
did the legislature not just amend the language to state that "D & E is not
covered by the bill," instead of inserting the subjective term "substantial
portion" to clarify the legislative bill? 79 As Justice Breyer pointed out, it
seems that the legislature wanted to avoid "more limiting language."' 8 °
Legislative intent aside, the fact is that the statute can be reasonably interpreted to include more than the D & X procedure.' As the
Eighth Circuit pointed out, the crucial problem with the statute is the use
of the term "substantial portion."' 18 2 It is conceded that there is no decisive consensus as to what would constitute a "substantial portion" of a
fetus."8 However, most should agree, as did the Eighth Circuit and the
district court, that "[iln any sensible and ordinary reading of the word, a
leg or arm is substantial. 18 4 The statute specifically barred the intentional delivery of a substantial portion of the fetus for the purpose of
aborting the unborn child. 5 During the D & E procedure, the physician
will typically deliver a leg or arm into the vagina for the purpose of
aborting the child; therefore, if "substantial" is interpreted to include an
arm or a leg, a physician is violating the law whenever he performs a D
86
& E.
Justice Thomas and the state tried to argue that statutes should be
changed language refers to the addition of the term "substantial portion."

179. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2616 (2000). As the majority
opinion
noted, the term "substantial portion" is subject to a variety of interpretations
and is
therefore extremely unclear. However, language similar to "D & E is not covered
by the
bill," can only be read to mean one thing: D & E is not covered by the bill.
180. Id. at 2616. This language would have undesirably categorized the statute
as
only prohibiting D & X.
181.
If the statute could be reasonably interpreted to prohibit more than D & X,
a
substantial barrier would be placed in the path of women. This interpretation
would
deter doctors form performing questionable procedures, for fear of prosecution,
conviction, or imprisonment. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2617.
182.
Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 1999).
183.
Senator Brasher, a supporter of the bill, was quoted as stating, "There's no question there will be a fact question as to what is a substantial portion." Respondents'
Brief
at 6, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99-830) (quoting Nebraska
legislative history of Legislative Bill 23 that is unavailable to the author but can be
found in
the Joint Appendix at 444).
184.
Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150; Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1129 (D.
Neb. 1998).

185.

NEB. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 28-326(9) (LEXIS 1998).

186. Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150. As a result, the statute should be interpreted
as prohibiting not only D & X but D & E as well, the most common second trimester
abortion
procedure. This places a substantial obstacle and an undue burden upon a
woman's
abortion decision and invalidates the statute.
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reasonably interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulty.8 7 However, as
the Eighth Circuit correctly pointed out, it is not reasonably possible for
the courts to "twist the words of the law and give them a meaning they
cannot reasonably bear" in an effort to avoid constitutional difficulty. 8
The majority agreed, stating that they were "without power to adopt a
narrowing construction of a state statute unless such a construction is
reasonable and readily apparent.' 1 9 The majority correctly concluded
that it would not be "reasonable to replace the term 'substantial portion'
with the Attorney General's phrase 'body up to the head.' "'90
The state and Attorney General also argued that the Court "must
defer to his views about the meaning of the state statute."' 9 However the
majority appropriately determined that the Attorney General's interpretative views should be given no controlling weight. 92 The majority cited
McMillian v. Monroe County and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades to assert
that they normally follow the lower federal courts' interpretations of
state law. 93 Two lower courts rejected the Attorney General's narrowing
interpretation of the statute, and the Court "rarely reviews a construction
of state law agreed upon by the two lower federal courts.' 9 4 Thus, the
majority properly affirmed the lower courts' decision that D & E was
also prohibited under the Nebraska state law.' 95 Additionally, the state
did not deny that if the statute applied to D & E as well as D & X, it
would impose an "undue burden" upon a woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. 96 Therefore, because the Court appropriately held the

187.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2647 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also made the same argument. Id. at 2623 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Petitioners' Opening Brief at 25, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (No. 99-830).
They were contending that if the statute was narrowly read, it would avoid constitutional difficulty.
188. Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150. The language of the statute could not be twisted and
interpreted to mean that only D & X is prohibited.
189. Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2616 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988)).
190. Id. at 2616. If the Court had read "substantial portion" to mean "body up to the
head," the statute would have only prohibited D & X and avoided constitutional difficulty.
191.
Id. at 2614. The Nebraska State Attorney General viewed the statute as only
prohibiting D & X.
192.
Id.
193.
Id. at 2614 (citing McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997);
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500, n.9 (1985)).
194.
Id. at 2614 (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. 484 U.S. 383, 395
(1988)).
195.
Id. at 2613.
196. See id.
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statute applicable to D & E, it is undisputed that the statute is unconstitutional under Casey's undue burden standard.' 97
The Health Exception
The majority properly applied Casey to hold that the statute was
also invalid because it did not contain a required health exception. 9 8
Such an exception is needed to preserve the health of the mother.' 99 Both
the state and the majority agreed that there are no conclusive medical
studies establishing the comparative safety of D & X to other procedures. 200 Furthermore, there is plausible evidence, from both sides supporting the contention that D & X is safer or not as safe as other procedures.20 ' The majority however found the evidence, in support of D & X,
more convincing and correctly determined that in certain circumstances,
performing a D & X procedure may be necessary to preserve the health
of the mother. 2 Dr. Carhart's testimony that D & X allows for minimal
instrumentation and reduces possible complications is not only credible
but also convincing.2 3 Carhart's testimony is supported by a statement
made in an amicus brief by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists stating, "depending on the physician's skill and experience, the D & X procedure can be the most appropriate abortion procedure for some women in some circumstances." 2 °
The majority also made a compelling argument by essentially
saying "it is better to be safe than sorry." As the majority noted:
[T]he division of medical opinion about the matter at most
means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not
its absence. [T]he uncertainty means a significant likelihood that
those who believe that D & X is a safer abortion method in certain circumstances may turn out to be right. If so, then the absence of a health exception will place women at an unnecessary

197.
198.
199.

See id.
See id.
Id.

200. Id. at 2611. If there were medical studies showing that D & X was unsafe or not
as safe as other procedures, there would be no need for a health exception.
201.
Id. at 2609-12.
202.
Id. at 2612-13.
203. Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1125 (D. Neb. 1998).

204.

Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2612 (quoting Brief for American College of Obstetri-

cians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 21-22, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct.
2597 (2000) (No. 99-830)).
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risk of tragic health consequences. If they are wrong, the excep205
tion will simply turn out to have been unnecessary.
An additional argument in favor of Dr. Carhart and a health
exception can be found in the language of the statute itself. The statute
states "no partial-birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless
such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother., 20 6 Moreover,
the state argued that there is no circumstance under which the D & X
procedure would be necessary to preserve the health or life of the
mother. °7 Here is the flaw in that argument. If there is no circumstance
under which the D & X procedure would be necessary to save the life of
the mother, then why did the legislature include a life exception within
the statute? The state directly contradicts itself. It is essentially conceding the fact that there may be a situation in which the D & X procedure
may be safer or necessary to save the life of the mother. The state says
there was no such need for a life exception, but it puts a life exception in
the statute. This, to a large extent, ruined the credibility of the state's
argument that there was no need for a life or a health exception. There
was a need for a health exception, and it should have been included
within the statute. As a result, the Court was correct in holding the Nebraska statute unconstitutional for lack of a health exception.
Impact of the Stenberg Decision
This case will have a significant impact on partial-birth abortion
laws nationwide. As Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas pointed out,
approximately thirty states have passed laws prohibiting partial-birth
abortions.20 8 Most of these statutes do not pass constitutional muster,
applying the standards set forth in Roe, Casey, and Stenberg.

205.

Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2612-13. The "matter" refers to whether D & X is safer

in certain circumstances.
206. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (LEXIS 1998). As noted before, this statement does not constitute a health exception. (Emphasis added). This statement only
incorporates a life exception, which is a much higher bar for physicians and women to
overcome. Under a life exception, a physician must show that without performing the
procedure in question, the woman has a high probability of dying. While a health exception, is a much lower bar for physicians to overcome. The physician simply has to proffer a reason as to why it would be healthier or safer to perform the procedure in question, such as the procedure takes less time than other accepted procedures, thus less
anesthesia is required. Therefore, in order for a statute to pass constitutional muster,
under the health exception requirement set forth in Casey, a statute must state something
to the effect of: "No partial-birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such
procedure is necessary to save the health and life of the mother."
207.

Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2610.

208.

Id. at 2635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Id. at 2656 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The Stenberg decision set forth two new basic tenets with which
all partial-birth abortion legislation must conform: A state is not allowed
to (1) prohibit the D & E procedure, before fetal viability; nor (2) prohibit the D & X procedure, unless there is a health exception.2 °9 Justice
O'Connor also made a significant point when she stated, "a ban on partial-birth abortion that only proscribed the D & X method of abortion
and that included an exception to preserve the life and health of the
mother would be constitutional ....
,,2 o This would allow a state to further assert, into the pre-viability period of development, its own interests
in the potentiality in human life. This additional credence given to a
state's interests would have the effect of diminishing a woman's own
interests in her personal well being and bodily integrity.
There is, however, a critical oversight with regards to the second
tenet. Following the guidelines set forth in Stenberg, a state will never
be able to effectively prohibit D & X, even if the legislature includes a
health exception, because physicians only perform the D & X procedure
when they consider it to be the safest procedure available. If a physician
believes that the D & X method is not the safest method available, he
will not attempt to perform the D & X but will rather opt for the procedure thought to be safer. 21' Thus, a physician will only perform the D &
X procedure if, in his opinion, it is the safest and healthiest method
available. This always-gives the doctor a health exception and always
allows him to perform the procedure.2 2 As a result, if a state does prohibit D & X, using the guidelines set forth in the majority's opinion, it
209. Id. at 2613.
210. Id. at 2620 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority opinion does not expressly
state what Justice O'Connor suggested in her opinion at 2620. However the majority
opinion did state: "[A] statute that altogether forbids D & X creates a significant health
risk. The statute consequently must contain a health exception." This seems to imply
that if a statute contains a health exception, it can altogether forbid D & X. Regardless
of how Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer would side
if this type of statute were ever presented, the four dissenting Justices would, at the very
least, agree with Justice O'Connor's contention. Thus, if a statute that only prohibited D
& X and included a health exception ever came before the Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor presumably would side with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, and the statute would be upheld.
211.
A health exception essentially means that the procedure would be healthier than
any other. A doctor would not perform one procedure if he truly thought that there was
another procedure that was safer, healthier, or more effective. The only time a health
exception would seem to work is if there was no difference between the healthiness of D
& X and another procedure. Then the health exception rule would prohibit the physician
from performing D & X.
212.
The health exception standard seems to be extremely broad, allowing the physician great leeway when determining whether a possible complication falls under the
standard.
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will have no real effect. Was the majority aware of this? The dissent
seemed to recognize the flaw. Justice Kennedy wrote, "a ban which depends on the appropriate medical judgment of Dr. Carhart is no ban at
all. He will be unaffected by any new legislation. This, of course,2 3is the
vice of a health exception resting in the physician's discretion.,, , Justice Thomas also expressed his disapproval over the health exception:
If Nebraska reenacts its partial birth abortion ban with a health
exception, the State will not be able to prevent physicians like
Dr. Carhart from using partial birth abortion as a routine procedure. This Court has now expressed its own conclusion that there
is "highly plausible" support for the view that partial birth abortion is safer, which, in the majority's view, means that the procedure is therefore "necessary." Any doctor who wishes to perunder the new statute will be able to do so
form such a procedure
214
impunity.
with
The majority must have contemplated this possibility. Did the
majority, in fact, covertly approve of the D & X procedure? Are they
hiding behind the health exception in order to avoid the repercussions
that would go along with the outright endorsement of the D & X technique?
Unlike D & E, which was readily endorsed by the Court, D & X
is a relatively new, unconventional procedure that has come against great
opposition by the general public. "The reaction to the development of
this procedure has been truly unprecedented. Nation-wide, large bipartisan majorities consisting of both pro-choice and pro-life legislators
have voted to ban the procedure in thirty States and both Houses of Congress., 21 5 The majority also acknowledged "the controversial nature of
the problem., 216 The Court realized that the D & X technique is a relatively gruesome procedure and that most would wince at the sight or
description of the technique, stating".., our discussion may seem clini2t 7 The macally cold or callous to some, perhaps horrifying to others.
jority, however, seemed to take the position that D & X is a medically
Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was
213.
directly addressing Justice O'Connor's assurance that Nebraska could ban D & X with a
health exception. Id. at 2620 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2652 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas concluded that there will
always be support for D & X and there will always be doctors who are of the opinion
that D & X is preferable.
Petitioners' Opening Brief at 4-5, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000)
215.
(No. 99-830).
216. See Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2604.
217. Id. at 2605.
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proven and arguably vital procedure that should not be prohibited, despite social and political disapproval. Thus, they may have been seeking
"to shield themselves from criticism," while also allowing the D & X
procedure to be performed. 218 The majority may have relied upon the
health exception to justify the validation of D & X and escape accountability for the approval of an unpopular procedure.
Whatever the Court's intent, this decision will result in the unrealistic ability of a state to effectively prohibit and regulate the D & X
procedure, even if a health exception is incorporated into the statute. The
health exception requirement, under Casey, allows the physician great
latitude when assessing which abortion procedure would be most beneficial for preserving the health and well-being of a woman. As a result,
unless the health exception requirement in Casey is overturned, neither
the federal government nor the states will be able to successfully prevent
physicians from performing any controversial pre-viability abortion procedure, for which there is substantial medical authority supporting the
contention that the procedure in question is comparatively safer. The
physician would most likely be able to circumvent the statutory prohibition by establishing that either: (1) Prohibiting the abortion procedure
places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a common,
proven, and preferred method of abortion (undue burden), or (2) The
prohibited procedure would be the safest and most effective method
available for terminating the life of the unborn fetus; thus, the procedure
is necessary to preserve the health and life of the mother (health exception).
CONCLUSION

The majority in Stenberg correctly applied the principles set
forth in Roe and Casey to hold that the Nebraska statute was unconstitutional. The majority properly deferred to the lower federal courts'
broader interpretation of the statute to hold that the language prohibited
D & E and thus placed an undue burden upon a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. The majority also appropriately held that the statute
lacked a required health exception needed to preserve the health and life
of the mother. Although Stenberg did not alter the legal principles set

218.

Id. at 2634 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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forth in Roe and Casey, this decision should provide significant direction
for the state legislatures and lower courts to follow when questions over
partial-birth abortion arise.
M. JASON MAJORS
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